











Lancaster University Management School 







Do better governed firms make more informative 






Wendy Beekes, Philip Brown and Germaine Chin  
 
 
The Department of Accounting and Finance           
Lancaster University Management School 




© Wendy Beekes, Philip Brown and Germaine Chin  
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/publications/ 
LUMS home page: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/ 









We investigate the link between the informativeness of corporate disclosures and 
firms’ corporate governance structures. Using a Canadian sample of firms rated in the 
November 2004 Board Shareholder Confidence Index, we examine whether corporate 
governance is a significant influence on the frequency of a firm’s disclosures, on 
analyst behaviour and on the timeliness of price discovery. We find Canadian firms 
with better governance structures release more documents to the stock market. These 
firms also attract a larger following of analysts, and their share prices integrate value-
relevant information more rapidly. Overall our results confirm other evidence 
suggesting corporate governance can play a significant role in determining the 
efficiency of a country’s equity market. 
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Corporate governance is an important factor influencing the integrity of a 
firm’s activities and how it operates.  How a firm is governed could have an impact 
on a firm’s transparency and performance, as well as demonstrating accountability to 
shareholders.  Investors’ and regulators’ concerns over possible corporate failures in 
recent times have fuelled a global demand for good corporate governance, and codes 
of practice for what constitutes good governance have been issued in many countries.  
Yet, there is still no consensus on the importance of corporate governance in 
influencing firms’ actions.  
We provide further insight into the relationship between a firm’s corporate 
governance quality (CGQ) and the informativeness of disclosures to the market in 
Canada.  Seven indicators of “informativeness” are used: (1) the frequency of 
disclosures to the market, (2) bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts, (3) accuracy of 
forecasts, (4) disagreement in forecasts, (5) the number of analysts following the firm, 
(6) how rapidly value relevant information is integrated into share prices and (7) the 
size of analysts’ forecast revisions. Our measure of CGQ is the Board Shareholder 
Confidence Index (BSCI) developed by Clarkson Center for Business Ethics and 
Board Effectiveness.  This measure reflects on the board’s independence, ownership 
and board practices, and several other factors.   
The evidence presented in this paper confirms that corporate governance is 
important. Canadian firms with better governance structures release more documents 
to the share market. These firms also attract a larger following of analysts. 
Furthermore, their share prices integrate value-relevant information more rapidly. We 
do not find that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate, but they do achieve greater 
consensus in their forecasts for better-governed firms. As for the size of analysts’ 
forecast revisions, our results are inconclusive. 
We contribute to the existing literature in corporate governance in several 
ways.  First, we examine the link between CGQ and the informativeness of 
disclosures to the market in Canada.  Second, we investigate analyst forecast 
properties and whether CGQ impacts on analysts’ forecasting ability and analyst 
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following.  Third, we provide further support for the view that CGQ is an important 
factor influencing firm transparency and disclosure. 
The next section discusses related literature and the Canadian experience. This 
is followed by sections describing the research method and data, and our findings.  





The Importance of Corporate Governance  
Many studies have examined the impact of corporate governance.  For a 
sample of 2,106 US firms, Larcker et al. (2005) examined 39 measures of corporate 
governance, reducing them to 14 factors using principal components analysis.  They 
concluded (p. 4) that corporate governance has “some ability to explain managerial 
decisions and firm performance and valuation.”  Using the G-index to measure CGQ, 
Gompers et al. (2003) concluded better corporate governance was associated with 
superior stock returns during the 1990s.1  Firms with strong managerial rights were 
found to have “significantly higher returns, were valued more highly and had better 
operating performance”, indicating the value of corporate governance (Gompers et al. 
2003: 108). Core et al. (2006) investigated the results of Gompers et al. to determine 
if the market is surprised by the performance of firms with poor governance.  Their 
results suggest this is not the case.  They found analysts understand the implications 
of weak governance and adjust their forecasts accordingly, concluding that the results 
in Gompers et al. were probably sample-specific.  Cremers and Nair (2005) found 
long term positive abnormal returns and profitability are associated with how well 
internal and external governance mechanisms complement each other.  In particular, 
blockholding has an impact on stock returns, but only when firms are vulnerable to 
takeover.  Therefore, CGQ as reflected in the G-index is only part of the governance 
story. 
Brown and Caylor (2004) found a positive relationship between CGQ (as 
indicated by Gov-score) and four measures of firm performance (return on equity, net 
profit margin, dividend yield and share repurchases) but not for a fifth measure, sales 
growth. When the G-Index was used to measure corporate governance, there was a 
positive relationship only between sales growth and CGQ.2 They attributed the 
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difference between their and other researchers’ results to the differing focus of their 
measure of CGQ, as the G-index primarily focuses on anti-takeover measures. 
CGQ may also impact on the disclosure level and the quality of firm 
disclosures. Beekes and Brown (2006) provided evidence of a positive association 
between the quantity of disclosure and CGQ for a sample of Australian firms. Firms 
with higher CGQ release more information, and the content of their disclosures also 
appears to be reflected on a timelier basis in share prices. Ajinkya et al. (2005) found 
greater board independence and institutional ownership have a positive effect on the 
likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts. If there is greater 
information disclosure, more institutional investors and analysts may be attracted to 
the firm (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Healy et al., 1999).    
The quantity of disclosure has been found to be positively related to analysts’ 
earnings forecast accuracy and negatively related to dispersion in forecasts (Hope, 
2003; Vanstraelen et al., 2003).  In addition, the quality of these disclosures is 
important for the precision of forecasts (Byard and Shaw, 2003). However, consensus 
in analyst forecasts may decline around earnings announcements as this provides 
analysts with incentives to generate their own information (Barron et al. 2002; Barron 
et al., 2005).  Lang and Lundholm (1996) showed that firms with more informative 
disclosure policies have less dispersed analyst forecasts and lower volatility in 
forecast revisions.  Prior research also suggests a link between analyst forecasts and 
CGQ.  Byard et al. (2006) concluded CGQ is positively associated with analyst 
forecast accuracy.  Firms with higher CGQ were also found to have a larger analyst 
following, but less consensus in forecasts (Beekes and Brown, 2006).  Note however, 
when comparing these studies that forecast accuracy differs across countries due to 
differing corporate structures, accounting practices and the adequacy of information 
disclosure (Brown et al., 2005).   
 
 
Prior Evidence for Canada 
Dutta and Jog (2004) found no evidence to suggest a link between CGQ and a 
firm’s share market performance (as measured by returns, after controlling for 
industry and the market to book ratio). A relationship did exist for an accounting 
performance measure (the industry adjusted return on assets) but it was negative; i.e., 
higher CGQ was associated with poorer performance. Wheeler and Davies (2006) 
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found little evidence to suggest CGQ is linked to changes in firm value for the largest 
Canadian firms on TSX.  However, for a sub-sample of firms which increased their 
CGQ ranking during their sample period, they found a significant positive association 
with long-term changes in market capitalization.  Klein et al. (2005) found evidence 
of a positive link between firm valuation (as measured by Tobin’s Q) and overall 
CGQ. However, when certain components of the CGQ measure were investigated 
separately, a positive relation was found for compensation, shareholder rights and 
disclosure, and a negative relation for board composition. Further analysis implied 
this negative relation for board composition was driven by family-controlled firms, 
where a lack of board independence might not be detrimental.   
We provide evidence on the importance of CGQ for firm disclosure and 
transparency in Canada.  We predict that firms with higher CGQ are more 
forthcoming and balanced in their disclosures and are as a consequence priced more 
efficiently in the market, i.e., in a timelier fashion.  “Timeliness” in our paper refers to 
the speed with which value relevant information is incorporated into share prices.  If 
disclosures are more informative for firms with better CGQ, following Lang and 
Lundholm (1996), we expect firms with higher CGQ to have greater analyst 
following, less biased and more accurate forecasts, with greater consensus amongst 
analysts, and less volatility in forecast revisions.  Beekes and Brown (2006) however 
found firms with better CGQ were associated with lower consensus amongst analysts 
and our paper will shed additional light on this issue. 
  
Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Canada 
In the early 1990s the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) commissioned a report 
into the corporate governance practices of Canadian firms. The outcome of this - the 
‘Dey’ report - provided the basis for the current guidelines on good practice 
(Chartered Accountants of Canada, 2001). Since 1995, companies have been required 
to disclose their compliance and explain any non-compliance with the guidelines 
(TSX, 2004b).3  However, a joint report sponsored by the TSX and Institute of 
Directors in 1999 concluded that standards of corporate governance were still 
inadequate in many companies.  The response to this was the formation of a joint 
committee comprising the TSX, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and the 
Canadian Venture Exchange, known as the Saucier committee. The Saucier 
committee’s final report in 2001 proposed changes to corporate governance guidelines 
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which included a re-emphasis on the importance of independent directors and board 
committee composition (Ontario Securities Commission, 2004). 
In 2003, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and Canadian Securities 
Administrators (CSA) began reviewing corporate governance. Draft instruments and 
policies were issued covering certification of financial statements, audit committees 
and internal control, to bring Canada more in line with Sarbanes-Oxley in the USA 
(Gray, 2005).  In January 2004, the OSC proposed policies relating to corporate 
governance and associated disclosures: National Policies 58-101 Disclosure of 
Corporate Governance and Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines.  Issues 
such as board independence, board mandate, director’s appointment, remuneration 
and education are the focal points of this policy which came into effect from 30 June 
2005 (OSC, 2005).  All issuers in Canada (whether listed or not) must explain how 
their corporate governance practices fit with the guidance.   
Timely disclosure of information is a requirement of listing and in addition to 
the guidance provided in National Policy 51-201 Disclosure Standards, the TSX also 
has a policy statement on the timeliness of firms’ disclosures (TSX, 2004a). The 
statement envisages a setting where “everyone investing in securities has equal access 
to information that may affect their investment decisions” (p. 1) and “material 
announcements are factual and balanced.” Therefore “unfavorable news must be 
disclosed just as promptly and completely as favorable news” (p. 5).  Our study 
specifically investigates whether firms with better CGQ are more forthcoming and 
balanced in their disclosures.   
 
 
Data and Method  
 Our paper addresses the following research questions:  Are firms with better 
CGQ more transparent in disclosures?  If so, is this reflected in the speed of price 
discovery and in analysts’ forecasts?  To address these questions, we examine 
whether firms with better CGQ disclose more information and how quickly their share 
prices reflect value-relevant information.  In addition, we examine whether, for better-
governed firms, analyst following is greater, forecasts are less biased and more 
accurate, there is greater consensus amongst analysts, and changes in analysts’ 




 Our primary sample comprises firms covered by the November 2004 Board 
Shareholder Confidence Index Report (BSCI), produced by the Clarkson Center for 
Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness. The report contains ratings for 216 
Canadian firms listed in the S&P/TSX composite index.  
For inclusion in the frequency of disclosure (document count) and timeliness 
models, there must be data availability of documents released over the period 2000-
2005, and daily share prices and market index data from Datastream. The records of 
all company disclosures for sample companies from 1 January 2000 to mid-2005 were 
collected from the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval 
(SEDAR).4 Mandatory corporate filings in the form of press releases, annual reports 
and financial statements are released via SEDAR. Therefore this could imply price 
sensitivity, as determined by Canadian securities authorities.5 The release dates for 
annual earnings (i.e. date of the fourth quarter announcement) were sourced from 
press releases on SEDAR. Missing (unidentified) dates were retrieved from 
Bloomberg. The final sample for the document count and timeliness models is 694 
observations.6 
 For inclusion in the analyst models, there must be I/B/E/S annual Earnings per 
Share (EPS) forecasts for the period 2002-2005, and at least 2 analysts contributing 
their forecasts to I/B/E/S for a horizon of between 1 and 23 months. Data for market 
values are sourced from Datastream, industry classifications are as reported on 
SEDAR and reclassified according to Global Industry Classification Standards.  Firms 
traded on the option market are sourced from the Montreal Exchange website. The 
final sample is 4,726 observations for the analyst models.7   
 
Measuring Corporate Governance Quality (CGQ) 
 We use the November 2004 BSCI report to measure CGQ. The factors 
included in the BSCI are director independence (Measure 1), stock ownership 
(Measure 2), meeting structure (Measure 3), board systems evaluation process 
(Measure 4) and board decision output (Measure 5), (Clarkson Centre for Business 
Ethics and Board Effectiveness, 2004b). For details, see the Appendix.  
 Each company is ranked in the report from AAA+ (highest) to C (lowest) on 
each factor, whereby AAA+ represents highest-quality corporate governance 
structures and C represents the other extreme. An overall grade (Measure 6) is given 
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by aggregating the grades obtained for the five factors evaluated separately. Grades 
for Measure 6 ranged from AAA+ to C. We transformed the letter grade to a numeric 
scoring system for data analysis, with 6 corresponding to AAA+ and 1 to C. We use 
the overall measure as our measure of CGQ in the main analysis and examine the 
individual components in robustness testing.8  
Frequency of Disclosure  
The model used to investigate the frequency of disclosure is: 
 
Log Doc Countit =  β0 + β1 Sizeit + β2 Good News it + β3 CGQ it  (1) 
 
where: 
Log Doc Count: This is the natural log of the number of documents released by the 
company over the 250 trading days ending 10 trading days after the 
company’s fourth quarter earnings report. 
Size: Firm size, proxied by the natural log of the firm’s market value of 
equity. 
Good news: Dummy variable which takes the value of one when the company’s 
share price outperforms the market over the 250 trading day period, 
and zero otherwise. 
CGQ: Company’s ranking in BSCI re-scaled to range from 1-6, where 
companies with higher scores are reported to have higher quality 
corporate governance structures 
 
We control for firm size and good news, since larger firms report more frequently 
than their smaller counterparts and firms with good news may be more likely to 
release information (Dye, 2001).  We expect firms with better CGQ make more 
frequent disclosures. 
Timeliness 
We use the metric developed by Beekes and Brown (2006) to examine 
timeliness at the entity level. The metric, cM , traces the share price over 250 trading 
days (about a calendar year) ending 10 trading days after the release of the firm’s 
earnings for the year. Specifically, timeliness, cM is defined as: 
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where tP  is the daily market adjusted share price and day 0 is 10 TSX trading days 
after the announcement date on SEDAR.  
 
Intuitively, if the price exactly tracked the market index from day -249 to day -1 and 
then fell on day 0 from 249−P  to 0P , the speed of adjustment would be categorised as 
‘slow’ and cM would be close to the absolute value of the market adjusted return over 
the 250 days. On the other hand, if price closed at 0P  (market adjusted) on day -249 
and exactly tracked the market index for the remaining 249 days, the speed of 
adjustment would be at its maximum and cM would be zero. At the individual firm 
level the metric could be influenced by idiosyncratic share return volatility.9 
However, if indeed, as predicted, companies release more timely information when 
they have higher CGQ, the metric should capture this feature, insofar as it feeds into 
stock prices (Beekes and Brown, 2006).  
The model used to investigate the timeliness of disclosures is: 
Timelinessit =  β0 + β1 Sizeit + β2 Good News it + β3 CGQ it (2) 
Variables are as previously defined. 
 
Analyst earnings forecasts 



























































































































Bias: Signed Forecast Error (FE). Forecast Error (FE) is defined as the mean 
forecast EPS less EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, deflated by the base 
share price (i.e. share price a year before the announcement month); 
Accuracy: Absolute value of the FE, deflated by the base price; 
Disagreement: Level of disagreement measured by the standard deviation across 
analysts’ forecasts for that firm-month, deflated by the base price; 
Following: Number of analysts contributing to the consensus forecast; 
Size: Firm size. Proxied by the natural log of the firm’s market value of 
equity a day before the I/B/E/S forecast cut-off date; 
Prev FE: Last year’s FE for the same firm and same forecast horizon, deflated 
by the previous year’s base price; 
ABSPrevFE: Absolute value of PrevFE, deflated by the previous year’s base price; 
Volatility: Volatility calculated from daily returns in the 60 trading days ended 
the day before the I/B/E/S forecast date, 
Resource:  Dummy variable coded 1 for firms in the natural resources industry, 0 
otherwise; 
Options: Dummy variable coded 1 for firms with exchange-traded options, 0 
otherwise; 
Horizon:  Forecast horizon, measured by the number of days from the forecast 
date until the company makes its annual earnings announcement to the 
TSX; 
Rev Volatility: Forecast Revision Volatility.  The standard deviation of the month-to-
month changes in the median forecast over the year leading up to the 
earnings release, deflated by the share price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. 
 
CGQ as previously defined. 
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Each model includes our measure of CGQ from BSCI.  Models 3a to 3d are 
based upon Beekes and Brown (2006).  Our Forecast Revision Volatility variable 
used in model 3e is based upon Lang and Lundholm (1996).  Data requirements for 
model 3e result in a reduced sample of 311 observations in estimations for this model.  
We include explanatory variables for analyst following and disagreement in the bias, 
accuracy and revision volatility models, and analyst following in the disagreement 
model.10   In our models we control for firm size as analysts tend to make more 
accurate forecasts and disagree less about the future earnings of larger companies. In 
addition, larger firms generally attract a greater analyst following (Bhushan, 1989). 
We control for the previous year’s forecast error over the same forecast horizon and 
its absolute value, return volatility and the length of the forecast horizon. A dummy 
variable for firms in the resource sector is included as they have more stringent 
disclosure requirements and are an important industry for Canada.   We also control 
for firms traded on the options market, which can provide more incentive for analysts 





Properties of the Sample 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are in Table 1 (frequency of 
disclosures and timeliness models) and Table 2 (analyst forecast models): correlations 
are reported in Table 3 (document count and timeliness models) and Table 4 (analyst 
models).   
 
 [Tables 1 - 4] 
 
Companies in the sample released between 1 and 273 documents over the 250 trading 
days ended 10 days after the release of their earnings for the year (Table 1). Relative 
to the market index, more than half the sample cases were years of good news 
(61.7%). Timeliness ranges from 0.02 to 1.74, with an average of 0.20. Timeliness 
deflated ranges from 0.02 to 0.89. CGQ has an average of 2.84 and a median of 3, on 
a scale of 1 to 6.  
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Analyst forecasts were on average biased upwards relative to actual EPS, with 
the mean forecast error being about 0.7% of the base share price and the median 
forecast error about 0.2% (Table 2). The absolute value of the forecast error 
(Accuracy) was about 2.1% of price. On average 8.5 analysts contributed to the 
I/B/E/S consensus forecast.  About 18% of the sample came from the resource sector 
and just under a third was traded on the options market. Daily volatility of share 
return ranged from less than 1% to 10.7%, with an average of about 2%. The mean 
CGQ rating is 3.  
Table 3 shows the correlations for the frequency of disclosure and timeliness 
models.  Due to the large number of pair-wise combinations of variables, our 
discussion is confined to salient pairs. The timeliness metrics are strongly correlated 
(r = 0.822); and CGQ is negatively correlated with timeliness and positively 
correlated with the disclosure frequency (Doc count and Log Doc Count), as 
expected.  Firm size is positively correlated with disclosure frequency and negatively 
associated with timeliness. 
Table 4 shows the correlations for the analyst models.  The forecast error 
(bias) and its absolute value (accuracy) are correlated (r = 0.41). In addition, while 
CGQ is negatively correlated with bias and disagreement, it is positively correlated 
with accuracy and analyst following. Examination of the correlation matrix for the 
forecast revision volatility model based on a smaller sample (not tabulated) suggests 
CGQ is negatively related to revision volatility (rev volatility).  The positive 
correlation between CGQ and forecast accuracy differs from our predictions and is 
investigated further with multivariate analysis.    
The correlations between the analyst and control variables (Table 4) show that 
analyst following is positively associated with firm size (r = 0.53).  Disagreement is 
positively associated with the previous year’s forecast error (PrevFE) and its absolute 
value (ABSPrevFE), and with stock volatility, suggesting greater dispersion in 
forecasts when last year’s forecasts were less accurate and when there is more 
uncertainty about stock prices.  Firm size is negatively associated with bias and 
accuracy, indicating forecasting is more accurate for larger firms. 
Results of Frequency of Disclosure and Timeliness models 
Table 5 reports regression results for the frequency of disclosure and 
timeliness models, estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). All regressors are 
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normalised to have mean zero and standard deviation of one, to assist interpretation.  




As predicted, firms with better CGQ report on a more regular basis, as do larger firms. 
However the good news dummy variable is insignificant: firms do not typically 
release more documents when they have good news.  
We also find support for our timeliness predictions. Recall, when value 
relevant information is incorporated into share prices more quickly, the timeliness 
metric is closer to zero. Our results show that value relevant information is priced 
more quickly for firms with better CGQ and for larger firms.  The deflated timeliness 
model provides comparable results for firm size and CGQ, albeit of a smaller 
magnitude. The deflated metric also indicates good news is priced more quickly.  
To acknowledge the possibility firms with higher CGQ are more balanced in 
their disclosure of bad and good news, an interaction term between CGQ and good 
news was added to the models. Our results (not tabulated) indicate no impact on the 
level of disclosure.  However in the timeliness model both coefficients are significant: 
-0.04 for CGQ (t-statistic = -4.64) and 0.06 for the CGQ*Good news interaction (t-
statistic = 2.55). Similar results are obtained when the deflated timeliness model is 
used. This is consistent with our expectations based upon the policy on timely 
disclosure issued by the TSX in June 2004 and suggests firms with better CGQ are 
more balanced in releasing news to the market, rather than accelerating or over-
emphasising good news. 
Results of Analyst Forecast Models 
The five analyst models were estimated by OLS and the results are shown in 
Table 6.   All regressors are normalised to have mean zero and standard deviation of 
one. White-adjusted t-statistics are reported in the table to control for 
heteroscedasticity.  All regression coefficients presented in Table 6 have been 





Our earlier analysis suggests that firms with better CGQ have more informative 
disclosure policies.  Inconsistent with our predictions, we find firms with higher CGQ 
are associated with greater bias (more “optimism”) in analyst forecasts and lower 
forecast accuracy.  Nevertheless, these firms are associated with greater analyst 
following suggesting that even with greater analyst following, analysts find it difficult 
to predict earnings for such firms.  The results for the disagreement model are 
inconclusive using Ordinary Least Squares estimation methods.  However using 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques (see robustness section for details) we 
find that the disagreement amongst analysts is lower for firms with better CGQ.  For 
the forecast revision model, the CGQ measure is unrelated to the volatility of forecast 
revisions, possibly due to the relatively small sample size for this particular model. 
Our results for the influence of CGQ on bias and accuracy are contrary to 
expectations, although Indjejikan (1991) suggests better quality firm disclosure is 
associated with greater reliance on private information, which could impact on the 
accuracy of individual forecasts.  Also as Clubb (2006) points out, for firms with a 
weak relationship between accounting and economic performance measures, where 
there is greater reliance on non-accounting measures for governance controls, it can 
be difficult for analysts to make accurate and consistent predictions.  
On average, analyst forecasts over the sample period were biased upwards. 
Bias increases with analyst disagreement, firm size, the extent of bias in the previous 
year’s forecast error, return volatility and forecast horizon. There is less bias for firms 
with greater analyst following, with a larger error in the previous year, for firms in the 
resource sector and for firms with options traded upon them.  
The average forecast error amounts to 2.1% of share price. Forecast error 
increases with the number of analysts following the stock, the level of disagreement 
among the analysts, the absolute value of the prior year’s FE, the forecast horizon and 
if the firm is from the resource sector. The findings relating to the number of analysts 
suggest analysts placed greater reliance upon their idiosyncratic information in 
making forecasts, resulting in lower forecast accuracy and greater disagreement. 
Despite increased disclosure requirements for the resource sector, the absolute value 
of the forecast error tends to be greater.  This sector typically has more uncertain 
earnings making it more difficult to make accurate predictions.  Firms traded on the 
options market and larger firms have smaller forecast errors.  
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 Disagreement increases with analyst following, absolute value of prior 
forecast error, return volatility and forecast horizon, and it is greater for firms from 
the resource sector. Although unexpected, the greater disagreement when there is a 
greater following is likely attributable to differing interpretations of information 
between analysts. Even when presented with the same disclosures, analysts may 
weight or interpret the information differently, potentially resulting in greater 
divergence in beliefs (Barron et al. 2005).  There is less disagreement for larger firms 
and firms with options traded upon them.  
On average, 8.5 analysts tracked each company. Analyst following increases 
with firm size and with the size of the previous year’s error, if the firm is from the 
resource sector and has exchange-traded options. Analyst following decreases with 
the extent of bias in last year’s forecast and with the forecast horizon.  
Finally, for our forecast revision volatility model, there is lower forecast 
revision volatility for firms with greater analyst following.  Greater forecast volatility 
is associated with disagreement amongst analysts, the absolute value of prior year’s 
forecast error and for firms from the resource sector. This suggests there is greater 
monthly variation in analysts’ consensus forecasts for firms in the resource sector, 
possibly due to greater uncertainty of earnings in this sector. Our CGQ measure is not 
significantly related to the volatility of forecast revisions. However, the sample size 
for this model is relatively small (N= 311) and therefore this result should be 





A number of tests were undertaken to investigate the robustness of the results 
in Tables 5 and 6. First, the document count and timeliness models were subject to (1) 
winsorising and (2) censoring the top and bottom 2.5% of cases in the tails of the 
distributions. The results (not tabulated) do not change inferences from previous 
analysis. Second, when stock return volatility is added to the regressors, CGQ retains 
its predicted sign and the explanatory power of the models is increased. Finally, when 
the sample period was restricted to 2003 – 2005 (N=420), the results were 
comparatively similar.  
For the first four analyst models, first we investigated whether our results are 
sensitive to the length of forecast horizon.12  We set the forecast horizon to a 
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maximum of 11 months and found CGQ is significant only in the accuracy and 
analyst following models.  For these models the coefficient sign on our primary 
variable of interest, CGQ, is consistent with our previous analysis.    Second, we 
investigated the use of alternative firm size proxies: (1) total assets, (2) total 
shareholders’ equity and (3) sales turnover, all logged and sourced from 
COMPUSTAT. For the accuracy and disagreement models, CGQ is robust to all three 
alternative size proxies. In all cases for the bias model, a significant negative 
coefficient is found for CGQ suggesting lower bias for firms with higher CGQ.  For 
the analyst following model CGQ is robust to all proxies, except for sales turnover, 
where the coefficient is negative.  Our results therefore appear to be sensitive to the 
definition of size.13 
Third, we investigated whether our results are sensitive to how we measure 
CGQ.  In particular, we used: (1) five binary dummy variables to reflect CG=1, 
CG=3, CG=4, CG=5 and CG=6 (CG=2 is captured in the constant term); and (2) a 
single dummy variable (=0 if CG=1 or 2, and otherwise =1).  In both cases the results 
are broadly consistent with the main results reported earlier.  
In further analysis, we investigated the possibility that the error terms in the 
analyst models are heteroscedastic and cross-correlated, through Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) regression techniques (Zellner, 1962).  The results for the CGQ 
variable (coefficients are multiplied by 100 for precision) in each of the models are as 
follows: Bias (coeff=0.094 p-value=0.06), Accuracy (coeff=0.180 p-value <0.001) 
Disagreement (coeff=-0.124, p-value <0.001) Following (coeff=28.64, p-value 
<0.001).  The sign of CGQ, our primary variable of interest, is unaffected when all 
four models are jointly estimated via SUR and is statistically significant at 
conventional levels except for forecast accuracy.14  Finally, we employed a 
resampling technique to address potential bias in t-statistics due to the lack of strict 
independence in the analyst sample. The bias arises because we have multiple 
observations of metrics for the same firm-year. The results confirm the findings 
already reported.15 
In summary, there is evidence to suggest our results for the document count 
and timeliness models are robust. For the analyst models, our results are relatively 
robust to the length of forecast horizon, measure of CGQ and analysis using 






We examined the influence of CGQ on the flow of information to the market 
for Canadian firms. Specifically, we examined whether CGQ has any bearing on the 
frequency of disclosures, analyst forecast bias, size of forecast revisions, forecast 
accuracy and disagreement, size of analyst following and timeliness of price 
discovery.  
We found better-governed Canadian firms release more documents and that 
value-relevant information about them is integrated into share prices more rapidly. 
This supports the hypothesis that CGQ influences the level of disclosure and the 
timeliness of price discovery, confirming the results in Beekes and Brown (2006). We 
find no compelling evidence Canadian firms release more information when their 
news is good.   
The results are mixed for the analyst forecast models. As expected, better 
CGQ is associated with less disagreement and greater analyst following. Findings 
with respect to forecast accuracy and bias are contrary to expectations, and suggest 
firms with better CGQ are associated with less accurate forecasts.     
It therefore seems that CGQ does play a role in the efficient operation of 
capital markets.   Clearly, if firms with better CGQ are seen to be more open and 
transparent in their disclosures, it could have major implications for investors and 




                                                 
1 The G index (compiled from publications of the Investor Responsibility Research Center [IRRC]) 
measures the relative level of shareholder and managerial rights, i.e., the balance of power between 
shareholders and managers. A point is added to the G-index for every provision that restricts 
shareholder rights (increases managerial rights). 
2 Brown and Caylor (2004) constructed the Gov-Score, from Institutional Shareholder Services data, 
based upon US firms meeting minimal acceptable standards of corporate governance. 
3 See Section 474 of the Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual for a list of the 14 Corporate 
Governance Guidelines. 
4 Filings of mandatory releases to SEDAR are made in accordance with National Instrument 13-101.  
5 Beekes and Brown (2006) focussed on documents classified by the Australian stock exchange as price 
sensitive. However, they reported their results were not sensitive to the inclusion of both price and non-
price sensitive documents in their models.  
6 The 694 observations relate to the 216 firms covered by the BSCI.  This is broken down across our 
sample period as follows: 2000: 5 firms, 2001: 132 firms, 2002: 137 firms, 2003: 147 firms, 2004: 151 
firms, 2005: 122 firms. 
7 The 4,726 observations relate to the 216 firms covered by the BSCI.  Firm coverage across our 
sample period in calendar years is as follows: 2002: 72 firms, 2003: 78 firms, 2004: 70 firms, 2005: 2 
firms. We adopt a longer period for the document count and timeliness models because, as Beekes and 
Brown (2006) acknowledged, their timeliness measure is noisy and a longer time period yields more 
cases. If our sample period is restricted to 2003 – 2005, comparatively similar results are obtained as 
reported in the section on robustness testing. 
8 This measure does not capture differences in CGQ for firms which have changed their governance 
structures over our study period. However, CGQ change tends to be fairly ‘lumpy’. To the extent firms 
changed their relative CGQ over our study period, our study is biased against rejecting the null 
hypothesis (of no relationship). 
9 To acknowledge this, we also include a measure of timeliness which is deflated by one plus the 
absolute rate of return on the share over the 250 trading-day period used to calculate the share’s 
timeliness metric. 
10 We investigate potential relationships between our variables through the use of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression techniques (see section on robustness testing). 
11 Bootstrapped t-statistics yield the same inferences. 
12 We do not conduct robustness tests for the forecast revision volatility model.  
13 However, the alternative size measures yield smaller and potentially biased sub-samples due to the 
requirement that the accounting variables be available on Compustat and have positive values. Sub-
sample sizes are 3,107 for total assets, 3,084 for total shareholders’ equity and 2,782 for sales turnover. 
14 In addition, we estimated this model using the SUR estimation method for the shorter horizon period 
of between 1 and 11 months. The results were consistent, except for the bias model, where CGQ was 
not statistically significant. 
15 Resampling is used to generate the empirical distribution of the regression coefficients under the null 
hypothesis that the observed dependent variable is unrelated to the R.H.S. variables. Details of the 
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APPENDIX 
Clarkson Center for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness: Board Shareholder Confidence Index 
 
Each company rated on the Board Shareholder Confidence Index begins with 100 points. Deductions are made from this total score if the criteria 
below are not met by a company to provide an overall score (measure 6).  
 
Measures & Corporate Governance Criteria which should be met 
INDIVIDUAL POTENTIAL 
1.  Director Independence - At least two-thirds of the Board of Directors should be independent of management  
- Not more than one interlocking board member 
- Not more than five S&P/TSX Board directorships for any board member 
2. Stock Ownership - Ratio of the average stock owned by a third of the board to the value of the directors’ annual retainer should be greater than four.  
GROUP POTENTIAL 
3. Meeting Structure - Separation of the Chief Executive and Chairman positions 
- Full independence of the board committees (Audit and Compensation Committees) 
- Equal voting rights for shareholders 
4. Evaluations - Regular and formal evaluation process for the Board and individual directors 
PAST PRACTICES 
5. Board decision output - Options less than 10% of the value of the company’s outstanding shares 
- Options to the CEO less than 5% of the value of the company’s outstanding shares 
- No re-pricing of options when share price has suffered 
- CEO compensation increase to be less than 25% in a year when the share price has decreased by more than 25% 
 
Source: Glossary of Terms (Clarkson Centre For Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness, 2004a). 
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Table 1 




Variables Doc Count Log Doc Count Timeliness  
Timeliness 
deflated Size Good news Volatility CGQ 
 Mean 65.578 4.059 0.203 0.134 7.259 0.617 0.026 2.840 
 Median 60 4.094 0.149 0.116 7.184 1 0.023 3 
 Maximum 273 5.610 1.737 0.893 11.870 1 0.111 6 
 Minimum 1 0 0.021 0.021 2.377 0 0.006 1 





Variables used in these models are based on Beekes and Brown (2006).  The sample (N=694) is constructed from the set of Canadian companies rated in the 
2004 Clarkson Center for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness Corporate Governance Report. Doc Count is the annual number of documents as retrieved 
from the SEDAR website from 2000-2005.  Log Doc Count denotes the natural logarithm (log) of Doc Count.  Timeliness is the timeliness metric, measured 
as the average daily absolute difference between the log of the market-adjusted share price that day and the log of market-adjusted share price 10 trading days 
after the release of the firm’s EPS for the year. Timeliness deflated is the timeliness metric divided by one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over the 
250 trading-day period used to calculate the share’s timeliness metric. Size is proxied by the log of the firm’s market value of equity as reported on the 
Datastream database 240 trading days before the release date. Good news is a dummy variable with a value of one if the market adjusted return over the 250 
trading days ended 10 days after the release date is positive, and is zero otherwise. Volatility is calculated from daily log returns in the 60 trading days ending 
the day before we observe the first price for the timeliness metric.   CGQ is Measure 6, which is the overall grade reported in the 2004 Clarkson Center for 
Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness Corporate Governance Report. The grade has been converted to a numeric score, with a higher grade corresponding 




Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Models Used To Explain Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts of Annual EPS 
 
Variables Bias Accuracy Disagreement Following Rev Size Prev FE ABS Prev FE Volatility Resource Options Horizon CGQ 
     Volatility         
 Mean 0.007 0.021 0.010 8.496 0.005 7.528 0.015 0.025 0.019 0.180 0.301 358.932 3.043 
 Median 0.002 0.009 0.005 8 0.003 7.394 0.002 0.009 0.017 0 0 356 3 
 Maximum 0.322 0.322 0.440 26 0.060 10.726 3.694 3.694 0.107 1 1 715 6 
 Minimum -0.183 0 0 2 0.000 2.182 -0.180 0 0.005 0 0 12 1 
 Std. Dev. 0.035 0.030 0.016 3.983 0.007 1.411 0.074 0.071 0.010 0.385 0.459 199.466 1.390 
 
Variables used in these models are based on Beekes and Brown (2006). The sample (N=4,726) is constructed from the set of Canadian companies with 
I/B/E/S annual EPS forecasts, from 2002-2005. The sample is restricted to cases where at least 2 analysts contributed to the forecasts on the summary file. 
The sample firms must also be rated in the November 2004 Clarkson Center for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness Corporate Governance Report. 
Forecast Error (FE) is defined as the mean forecast EPS less actual EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, and is deflated by base price (stock price one day before the 
I/B/E/S cutoff date for forecasts made a year before the release date). Bias is the signed FE and accuracy is its absolute value. Disagreement is the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts for that firm month, deflated by base price. Following is the number of analysts contributing to the consensus forecast.  Rev 
Volatility is Earnings forecast revision volatility measured as the standard deviation of the month-to-month changes in the median earnings forecasts over the 
year leading up to the earnings release, deflated by base price (this variable is based on a smaller sample, N=311).  Size is proxied by the natural log of market 
value of equity as reported on Datastream database one day before the I/B/E/S forecast cut off date. Prev FE is the prior year’s FE is for the same firm and for 
the same horizon, deflated by previous year’s base price. ABSPrev FE is the absolute value of Prev FE, deflated by previous year’s base price.  Volatility is 
calculated from daily returns in the 60 trading days ended the day before the I/B/E/S forecast date. Resource is a dummy variable coded 1 for the resource 
sector, 0 otherwise.  Options is a dummy variable coded 1 for firms with exchange traded options, 0 otherwise. Horizon is the forecast horizon measured as 
the number of days from the forecast date until the company releases its annual earnings to the TSX. CGQ is Measure 6, which is the overall grade reported in 
the 2004 Clarkson Center for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness Corporate Governance Report. The grade has been converted to a numeric score, with 




Correlations (product moment) of Variables used in Frequency of Disclosures and Timeliness Models 
 
Variables Timeliness Timeliness Doc Log Doc Size Good News Volatility 
  deflated Count Count    
Timeliness deflated 0.822       
Doc Count -0.033 -0.051      
Log Doc Count -0.071 -0.104 0.897     
Size -0.396 -0.315 0.287 0.247    
Good News 0.037 -0.127 -0.022 0.021 -0.057   
Volatility 0.458 0.435 -0.017 -0.038 -0.451 0.006  
CGQ -0.175 -0.189 0.076 0.124 0.132 0.043 -0.202 
        
 
 




Correlations (product moment) Among the Continuous Variables used in Models of Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
 Bias Accuracy Disagreement Following Size PrevFE ABSPrev FE Volatility Horizon 
Accuracy 0.414         
Disagreement 0.199 0.469        
Following -0.208 -0.042 -0.067       
Size -0.140 -0.200 -0.259 0.532      
PrevFE 0.180 0.225 0.266 -0.120 -0.211     
ABSPrevFE 0.168 0.308 0.331 -0.089 -0.226 0.923    
Volatility 0.155 0.199 0.380 -0.237 -0.504 0.228 0.253   
Horizon 0.095 0.276 0.122 -0.143 -0.023 0.092 0.145 0.105  




Notes: N= 4,726. See Table 2 for the definitions of the variables. 
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Table 5 
Results of OLS Regression Estimates: For Frequency of Disclosures and Timeliness Models 
 
 Log Doc Count  Timeliness   Timeliness deflated 
Variable Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t)  Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t)  Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t) 
Intercept 4.059 206.76 <0.001  0.203 32.89 <0.001  0.134 46.26 <0.001 
Size 0.128 6.18 <0.001  -0.067 -7.65 <0.001  -0.025 -7.93 <0.001 
Good news 0.015 0.72 0.472  0.004 0.56 0.579  -0.011 -3.52 <0.001 
CGQ 0.049 2.70 0.007  -0.022 -3.96 <0.001  -0.011 -4.30 <0.001 
            
Adjusted R2 0.0675    0.1679    0.1356   
N 694    694    694   
F-stat. 17.72    47.62    37.231   
Prob. (F) <0.001    <0.001    <0.001   
 
Note: See Table 1 for the definitions of the variables.  All regressors are normalised with mean zero and standard deviation of one, so that the intercept is the mean of the dependent 
variable and each coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable predicted for one standard deviation change in the regressor. White’s heteroscedasticity adjustment is applied 






OLS Regression Estimates: Bias, Accuracy and Disagreement in Analysts’ Forecasts, Number of Analysts Following the Share and Forecast Revision Volatility 
 
    Bias       Accuracy       Disagreement     
  
Following   Rev Volatility 
Variable Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t)   Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t)   Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t)   Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t)   Coefficient t-stats Prob.(t) 
Intercept 0.725 14.883 <0.001  2.064 58.049 <0.001  0.999 49.269 <0.001  849.556 195.979 <0.001  0.504 22.435 <0.001 
Following -0.465 -5.976 <0.001  0.111 1.896 0.058  0.053 1.902 0.057      -0.116 -2.568 0.011 
Disagreement 0.580 2.603 0.009  1.073 3.867 <0.001          0.542 12.378 <0.001 
Size 0.369 4.608 <0.001  -0.265 -3.875 <0.001  -0.132 -2.717 0.007  130.003 18.703 <0.001  0.017 0.342 0.733 
PrevFE 0.459 2.066 0.039  -0.581 -4.082 <0.001  -0.262 -1.967 0.049  -40.827 -2.329 0.020  0.036 1.263 0.207 
ABSPrevFE -0.053 -0.180 0.858  0.925 3.540 <0.001  0.588 2.823 0.005  36.996 2.098 0.036  0.087 2.840 0.005 
Volatility 0.238 3.328 0.001  -0.106 -1.701 0.089  0.439 6.529 <0.001  -0.613 -0.117 0.907     
Resource -0.286 -3.740 <0.001  0.395 6.261 <0.001  0.222 6.384 <0.001  96.310 18.760 <0.001  0.042 1.823 0.069 
Options -0.389 -5.865 <0.001  -0.163 -3.795 <0.001  -0.038 -1.749 0.080  116.021 18.184 <0.001  0.008 0.380 0.705 
Horizon 0.151 2.821 0.005  0.636 15.492 <0.001  0.093 3.326 0.001  -55.118 -12.583 <0.001     
CGQ 0.094 1.667 0.096  0.245 6.846 <0.001  -0.024 -1.338 0.181  22.062 5.047 <0.001  0.033 1.303 0.194 
                    
Adjusted R2 0.106    0.322    0.237    0.440    0.687   
N 4,726    4,726    4,726    4,726    311   
F-stat 56.920    225.652    164.097    465.665    85.904   
Prob. (F) <0.001    <0.001    <0.001    <0.001    <0.001   
 
  
Note: See Table 2 for the definitions of the variables.  All regression coefficients have been multiplied by 100 to increase precision.  All regressors are normalised with mean zero and standard deviation of one, so that the intercept 
is the mean of the dependent variable and each coefficient indicates the change in the dependent variable predicted for one standard deviation change in the regressor.  White’s heteroscedasticity adjustment is applied when 
calculating t-statistics and t-probability is for a two-tailed test. 
